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ABSTRACT
Objective: To evaluate the clinical and cost-
effectiveness of a new blended dental contract
incentivising improved oral health compared with a
traditional dental contract based on units of dental
activity (UDAs).
Design: Non-randomised controlled study.
Setting: Six UK primary care dental practices, three
working under a new blended dental contract; three
matched practices under a traditional contract.
Participants: 550 new adult patients.
Interventions: A new blended/incentive-driven
primary care dentistry contract and service delivery
model versus the traditional contract based on UDAs.
Main outcome measures: Primary outcome was as
follows: percentage of sites with gingival bleeding on
probing. Secondary outcomes were as follows:
extracted and filled teeth (%), caries (International
Caries Detection and Assessment System (ICDAS)),
oral health-related quality of life (Oral Health Impact
Profile-14 (OHIP-14)). Incremental cost-effective ratios
used OHIP-14 and quality adjusted life years (QALYs)
derived from the EQ-5D-3L.
Results: At 24 months, 291/550 (53%) patients
returned for final assessment; those lost to follow-up
attended 6.46 appointments on average (SD 4.80). The
primary outcome favoured patients in the blended
contract group. Extractions and fillings were more
frequent in this group. Blended contracts were
financially attractive for the dental provider but carried
a higher cost for the service commissioner. Differences
in generic health-related quality of life were negligible.
Positive changes over time in oral health-related quality
of life in both groups were statistically significant.
Conclusions: This is the first UK study to assess the
clinical and cost-effectiveness of a blended contract in
primary care dentistry. Although the primary outcome
favoured the blended contract, the results are limited
because 47% patients did not attend at 24 months.
This is consistent with 39% of adults not being regular
attenders and 27% only visiting their dentist when they
have a problem. Promotion of appropriate attendance,
especially among those with high need, necessitates
being factored into recruitment strategies of future
studies.
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This is the first published research which
explores health outcomes from a preventive
focused dental service delivery model.
▪ The research shows that patients in the practices
with the blended contracts significantly reduced
gingivitis as measured by bleeding on probing
when compared with a traditional service model.
This is the first study to confirm that a contract
that incentivises prevention can demonstrate a
health improvement outcome.
▪ Neither the practices nor the participants in the
study were randomised which is likely to lead to
a degree of bias, given that all the practices were
self-selected.
▪ The reduction in bleeding on probing was 10%;
however, the effect is likely to be larger as the
study had a large number of patients lost to
follow-up. The high loss to follow-up, while a
limitation of the study, exemplifies the challenges
of running a dental practice in order to improve
patients’ oral health; from this perspective, the
data have greater external validity than a highly
controlled study with artificially high rates of
reattendance.
▪ The study was also the first to examine the cost-
effectiveness of a preventive focused contract.
The cost to the commissioners of the service
was higher than the traditional model, but more
research is needed to assess whether this
up-front investment is recouped into the long
term and longer than the 24 months study
follow-up period.
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INTRODUCTION
In the UK, there is an increasing trend to the use of
ﬁnancial incentives. This is evidenced in National
Health Service (NHS) primary care, including dentistry.1
Within dentistry commissioning, over the past decade
has seen dental contracts moving away from payment for
units of dental activity (UDAs) towards incentive-driven
blended contracts that link with key performance indica-
tors such as access, quality and improved health
outcome.2 This has included (as part of the Department
of Health Dental Contract Reform Programme) a series
of national NHS dental contract evaluations exploring
how focus can shift from treatment and repair to preven-
tion and oral health by introducing of a new clinical
pathway and new remuneration models.2 Preliminary
ﬁndings from the pilots have focused on patient and
practitioners views of the new clinical pathway, reporting
them to be strongly supportive.3 More recent ﬁndings
focus on adaptation to the new system but also report
positive indications about clinical beneﬁts in terms of a
reduction of risk and health improvement (the latter
measured a basic periodontal examination). However,
there are few data from outside the pilot sites that allow
comparison of the relative effects of the different
contracts.4
Evidence of the effectiveness of contracting and incen-
tives in health provision is still emerging with mixed
results.1 5 6 There are questions over their long-term
effects on health outcomes, especially since important
activities that lack a target may be underemphasised.7 8
Within dentistry, evidence suggests that changes to
incentive structures can have a substantial impact on
dentists’ behaviour, particularly their treatment prescrib-
ing patterns9 shifting towards treatments with high
rewards relative to costs, as opposed to selecting on the
basis of clinical factors alone. But, again, the evidence is
mixed10–12.
A blended/incentive-driven commissioning model for
dental services was introduced in West Yorkshire,
designed to incentivise quality and oral health improve-
ment in addition to treatment volume. In total, 60% of
the contract value was apportioned to delivery of a set
number of UDAs. The remaining 40% was dependent
on the delivery of quality (systems, processes, infrastruc-
ture 20% and oral health improvement 20%). The
blended/incentive-driven contracts were conﬁgured to
encourage the following: the delivery of evidence-based
preventive interventions in line with identiﬁed needs for
a deﬁned population; greater access to dentistry and
care being provided by the most appropriate team
member. Accordingly, all the practices working under
the new contract employed dental hygienists or thera-
pists to provide treatments within their remit. The new
contract was built around a care pathway approach in
which all patients had an Oral Health Assessment on
joining the practice and at each subsequent recall. Four
sets of information (age group, medical history, social
history (self-care, habits/diet) and clinical assessment)
were used to inform a trafﬁc-light (red, amber, green
(RAG)) system indicating whether patients are at high
(red), medium (amber) or low (green) risk of oral
disease. The care pathway was tailored to the risk cat-
egory of the patient and evidence-based preventive
advice and interventions13 and on completion and risk-
based recall interval.14
The aim of this study was to evaluate the clinical and
cost-effectiveness of the blended/incentive-driven contract.
METHODS
Using a non-randomised controlled design, the study
included three dental practices working under the
blended contract and three working under the UDA
(traditional) contract. Practices working under the trad-
itional contract were included in the study as compara-
tors and matched with practices working under the new
blended contracts by deprivation index, age proﬁle, size
of practice and ethnicity. All practices were based in
West Yorkshire, UK.15 16 RAG was not undertaken in
traditional practices and two of them employed a thera-
pist or hygienist.
Clinical effectiveness
To assess clinical effectiveness for patients receiving care
from practices working under the new blended contracts
versus those receiving care under the traditional con-
tracts, the primary outcome was the percentage of sites
per patient with bleeding on probing (BoP). Secondary
outcomes included the following: caries (assessed using
the International Caries Detection and Assessment
System (ICDAS)),17 percentage of extracted and ﬁlled
teeth and oral health related quality of life (Oral Health
Impact Proﬁle-14 (OHIP-14) total score).18 Sample size
was powered using BoP. We estimated the SD in percent-
age sites with BoP across a UK cohort to be 27.5%,
assuming a within-patient correlation at baseline to
follow percentage sites BoP of 0.5 and a common vari-
ance in practices. We assumed a clinically meaningful
mean difference in percentage sites BoP baseline to
follow-up in practices working under blended contracts
of 10%, versus a mean difference in percentage sites
BoP baseline to follow-up in practices under traditional
contracts of 0%. We ﬁxed a type I error rate of 0.05 and
a power of 0.8. A design effect was included to account
for clustering of patients within both groups of practices,
assuming an intracluster correlation of 0.2. A two-sided
two independent samples t-test identiﬁed a total of 550
patients to be recruited (allowing for a 10% loss to
follow-up).
At the patient level, inclusion criteria were that
patients must be aged 16 years and over, willing to be fol-
lowed up for 24 months and give informed consent, a
new patient to the dental practice and able to complete
the patient complete questionnaires. Postcode, age and
ethnicity of all patients included within the sample were
recorded and proﬁled during the analysis.
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The practices opened their lists to recruit new patients
and all new patients attending the practice for the ﬁrst
time were invited to participate. Before their scheduled
appointment, each was sent a letter of invitation and
information sheet. Each gave informed consent to par-
ticipate in the INCENTIVE study prior to any data col-
lection. Patients completed the EQ-5D-3L19 and
OHIP-1420 at their ﬁrst visit and at the follow-up visit
24 months later. The dentist undertook the clinical
assessment of teeth and gingivae using ICDAS and BoP
at both visits. Family/social history was taken at the ﬁrst
visit only. Patients were contacted by the dental practice
6–8 weeks before their 24 months follow-up date to
arrange an appointment. Contact assumed a variety of
mediums including telephone, short message service
(SMS) and letter in order to maximise follow-up.
Non-responding patients were contacted at least three
times to encourage attendance for the ﬁnal follow-up
appointment. Patient contributors worked as integral
members of the research team from conception of the
research idea to shape our research questions and aid
delivery, project management and ﬁnal data interpret-
ation through to reporting.
An analysis of covariance approach was used to model
the primary and secondary outcome measures with
follow-up measurement as the outcome and baseline
measurement as a covariate.
Cost effectiveness
We undertook within study cost-effective analyses for
patients receiving care from practices working under the
new blended contracts versus those receiving care under
the traditional contracts, presenting the results as incre-
mental cost-effective ratios (ICERs) from (i) the commis-
sioners’ and (ii) service providers’ perspective.
UK NHS primary care dentistry is typically commis-
sioned from NHS providers or corporate for proﬁt or
not-for-proﬁt bodies. In order to calculate the per
person cost to the commissioners (contractual pay-
ments), the ﬁnancial value of the contracts for all six
practices in the relevant years was divided by the total
number of patients attending at least one appointment
in each year to provide a per person mean cost to the
commissioner using data provided by NHS England.
The cost to the provider was made up of the cost of
the provision less the contractual payment received.
Within the study information was collected on the
number and duration of appointments, the type of treat-
ment and the dental professional carrying out the
appointment/treatment. This information was provided
by the practices from the appointment history of each
patient. Material costs such as those for X-ray ﬁlms or
ﬁlling materials are shown in table 1. The salaries of the
different staff involved in the treatment were obtained
from national sources such as the Pay Circular and the
NHS Agenda for Change and overhead costs were cal-
culated replicating a previously used method21 (see
table 1). Contractual payments were made up of the
total value UDAs claimed for participants included in
the analysis subtracted from the costs.
The cost-effective analyses used OHIP-14 and EQ-5D-3L
completed at the ﬁrst and 24 months follow-up visits. The
EQ-5D-3L was used to derive quality adjusted life years
(QALYs)19 22 but as has been suggested, is insensitive in
oral health conditions,21 and thus, a second analysis was
undertaken using OHIP-14.18 20 The analyses uses the
incremental cost per unit change in OHIP-14 score and
the cost per QALY. ICERs are presented. To account for
uncertainty around mean incremental costs and effective-
ness, we conducted sensitivity analyses and non-
parametric bootstrapping; sensitivity analyses were further
carried out to account for uncertainty in the cost values.
For the commissioner’s perspective, we performed
one-way sensitivity analyses by assuming either no change
or a 3% increase in the total contract value per (ﬁnan-
cial) year or a 0%, 10% increase or 10% decrease in the
number of patients treated per year. For the analysis from
the service providers’ perspective, costs were altered by
±20%. While these values are essentially arbitrary, it was
considered likely to represent any uncertainty in the cost
values.
In all cost-effective analyses, costs and salaries are
adjusted for inﬂation and a price year of 2012 used. A
discounting rate of 3.5% was used for costs and out-
comes.23 For the effectiveness and cost-effective analyses,
missing data for the OHIP-14 were imputed using
median imputation if 2 or less OHIP-14 item scores were
missing.24 Participants who had more than 2 compo-
nents of the OHIP-14 missing or missing EQ-5D-3L at
baseline and follow-up were excluded from the cost-
effective analyses.
RESULTS
Recruitment started on 1 June 2012 (the ﬁrst patient
entered the study on 14 June 2012) and ﬁnished on 31
January 2013. A total of 550 participants were recruited
at baseline, of whom, 291 returned 24 months later for a
follow-up. There was little difference in age, gender or
ethnicity between those who were included in these ana-
lyses and those lost to follow-up, those who were lost
were generally younger, more likely to be male and had
worse baseline oral health, as measured by BoP (higher
mean), although this was more variable (higher SD)
(table 2). Those lost to follow-up attended 6.46 (SD
4.80) appointments on average.
Clinical effectiveness
Of the 550 recruited, 529 had BoP recorded at baseline
but only 270 at 24 months. Following data cleaning, 188
were included in the BoP analysis (n=90 new blended
contract, n=98 traditional contract). For BoP, a 95% CI
for the effect size was (3.23%, 17.25%) indicating a posi-
tive effect for participants under the new blended con-
tracts, but with considerable uncertainty in magnitude.
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For caries, 269 had ICDAS recorded at baseline and
follow-up, and after data cleaning 187 were analysed
(n=92 new blended contract, n=95 traditional con-
tract). There were fewer extractions and ﬁllings at
follow-up among patients in practices under the trad-
itional contract by an average of 4.43% (95% CI 1.34%
to 7.52%).
Overall practices with traditional contracts had a
higher follow-up OHIP-14 score (n=176) by 3.05
(p<0.01), indicating worse oral health related-quality of
life. For the oral health assessment (practices under the
new blended contracts only), for those who attended
baseline and follow-up (n=111), there was an improve-
ment with 68.47% red at baseline and 44.14% red at
follow-up.
Cost effectiveness
A total of 210 patients were included in the cost-effective
analyses (n=108 in blended contract practice group and
n=102 in traditional group). Four patients withdrew
before their appointment, ﬁve patients did not have
appointment history data at baseline and/or follow-up
(hence, costs could not be estimated) and 289 patients
did not attend for the follow-up assessment. From the
remaining 252 patients, 42 patients had more than two
components of the OHIP missing or missing EQ-5D-3L
at baseline and follow-up. The age, gender or ethnicity
were similar in those included in these analyses and
those lost to follow-up. Of those included in the blended
practice group, the mean age was slightly lower (40.66 vs
43.14), there were slightly fewer men (45.6% vs 51%)
and fewer patients who recorded their ethnicity as
‘white’ (72.4% vs 79.1%).
The mean number of UDAs per person was 11.23 (SD
8.08) in the blended practices and 10.74 (SD 8.23) in
the traditional practices. However, there were negligible
differences in the average number of UDAs per person
if patients’ were seen by a dentist, 10.70 (8.07) and
10.58 (8.25), respectively. It is difﬁcult to draw conclu-
sions for the therapist and hygienist as some of the prac-
tices did not employ dental care professionals. Patients
in practices with the blended contracts had more
appointments than those in traditional practices, mean
number of appointments 8.89 (4.50) and 6.63 (2.93),
respectively.
The mean per person cost for the blended contact
group was higher for the service commissioner (mean
per person cost of £459.77 vs £281.57). However, the
blended contracts were ﬁnancially attractive for the
dental provider at the practice level (costs less contrac-
tual payments equated to a mean per person cost of
£−209.26 vs £−116.21, table 3).
No signiﬁcant difference in EQ-5D-3L scores were
found between groups or over time (table 4). Overall,
Table 1 Salaries and overheads, cost of materials and laboratory costs
Salary Per hour Source
Dentist £32.89 Pay circular (M&D) 1/2011
Therapist £16.59 NHS Agenda for Change pay scales 2011/2012
Hygienist £13.56
Oral health educator £11.17
Overheads % of income Dentist Therapist Hygienist Oral health educator
Wages and NI (per hour) 17.42% £32.89 £16.59 £13.56 £11.17
Overheads (per hour) 12.77% £24.11 £12.16 £9.94 £8.19
Material Cost Source
X-rays
Optimum film
£0.33 Kent Express Dental Supplies.
2014. URL: http://www.
kentexpress.co.uk/gb-en/kent/
default.aspx?did=kent
X-rays
Periapical film
£0.28
Amalgam filling
1 spill
£0.90
Amalgam filling
Dycal (base 13 g and
catalyst 11 g)
£21.20
Laboratory Cost Source
Denture
Full upper or lower only with
standard teeth (×2 for F/F)
£167.05 MGill. 2011 Price List. 2011.
URL: http://mgill.co.uk/Price_
list/index.html
Crown £116.00
Bridge £131.00
All material costs include VAT and 15% off the Kent Catalogue price. The cost of chemicals used to develop the film is excluded but is minimal.
M&D, Medical and Dental; NHS, National Health Service; NI, National Insurance; VAT, value-added tax.
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Table 2 Demographic and baseline outcome measures by follow-up status
New blended contract practices Traditional contract practices
Practice Practice 3 Practice 2 Practice 1 Practice 6 Practice 5 Practice 4
N 26 vs 14 82 vs 79 20 vs 56 16 vs 21 56 vs 35 70 vs 54
Age in years (SD) 47.11 vs 48.50
(17.58 vs 18.12)
41.18 vs 39.38
(13.51 vs 12.81)
35.25 vs 34.43
(14.27 vs 11.33)
42.50 vs 39.48
(16.85 vs 15.70)
39.05 vs 37.57
(14.47 vs 13.33)
44.13 vs 36.93
(16.34 vs 12.85)
Gender: Male/female 12/14 vs 7/7 (46.15/
53.84 vs 50.00/
50.00)??
37/38* vs 40/37* (45.12/
46.34 vs 50.63/46.83)
7/13 vs 29/27 (35.00/
65.00 vs 51.78/48.21)
7/9 vs 8/13
(43.75/56.25 vs
38.10/61.90)
30/26 vs 19/16
(53.57/46.43 vs
54.29/45.71)
30/37* vs 31/18*
(42.86/52.86 vs
57.41/33.33)
Ethnicity: White/other 24/2 vs 13/1 (92.31/
7.69 vs 92.86/7.14)
49/28* vs 56/23 (59.76/
34.15 vs 70.89/29.11)
15/5 vs 34/22 (75.00/
25.00 vs 60.71/39.29)
15/1 vs 20/1
(93.75/6.25 vs
95.24/4.76)
40/16 vs 19/16
(71.43/28.57 vs
54.29/45.71)
37/9* vs 22/8*
(52.86/12.86 vs
40.74/14.81
% of sites BoP 26.04 vs 32.40
(20.17 vs 18.98)
25.09 vs 34.39
(27.42 vs 48.52)
6.19 vs 7.67
(5.79 vs 8.18)
22.39 vs 32.07
(12.21 vs 21.10)
27.23 vs 38.28
(23.48 vs 36.49)
30.66 vs 40.56
(38.56 vs 42.38)
% extracted and filled teeth 32.63 vs 33.19
(25.56 vs 16.80)
39.39 vs 44.13
(31.96 vs 31.34)
32.36 vs 34.87
(23.74 vs 29.48)
47.41 vs 56.01
(31.08 vs 30.64)
33.97 vs 51.26
(33.11 vs 37.11)
44.96 vs 39.67
(34.16 vs 31.80)
OHIP-14 total score 2.50 vs 5.79 (3.86 vs
5.77)
12.08 vs 15.30
(11.11 vs 13.67)
12.89 vs 11.47
(14.64 vs 9.33)
13.19 vs 10.38
(14.01 vs 13.49)
10.43 vs 18.69
(11.75 vs 13.32)
7.20 vs 10.30
(8.74 vs 10.23)
Risk assessment: Red/
amber/green
8/14/4 vs 7/5/2 (30.77/
53.85/15.38 vs 50.00/
35.71/14.29)
64/13/5 vs 66/11/2
(78.05/15.85/6.10 vs
83.54/13.92/2.53)
15/5/0 vs 44/11/0*
(75.00/25.00/0.00 vs
80.00/20.00/0.00)
Completed follow-up versus loss to follow-up, mean (SD) for continuous variables, n (%) for categorical variables.
*Counts do not add to total due to missing data.
BoP, bleeding on probing; OHIP-14, Oral Health Impact Profile-14.
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improvement was observed in OHIP-14 scores between
baseline and follow-up for both groups. The mean
OHIP-14 scores were 7.11 vs 8.00 for the patients in the
blended contract practice and traditional practices,
respectively. The ICERs are reported in table 5.
The sensitivity analyses made little difference to the
results with the exception of the bootstrapping from the
service providers’ perspective which produced an ICER
of £9483.68 (under the threshold value). However, it
should be noted that the ICER is being driven by the
incremental QALY; a small increase in the (already
small) incremental QALY will have a big impact.
DISCUSSION
Participants of the INCENTIVE study were recruited
from practices that had purposefully opened their prac-
tices to new patient enrolment. The blended contract
practices were newly established in areas of high need
and where there was little existing service, they therefore
had a less established patient base. However, the study
was limited to new patients only within mainly deprived
communities where routine attendance is low. Within
the study the primary outcome favoured patients in the
blended contract group. The blended contracts were
ﬁnancially attractive for the dental provider but carried
a higher cost for the service commissioner. However, the
attrition rate was much higher than anticipated. It
appears that many patients chose not to return to their
dentist for routine follow-up appointments. Recall visits
for oral care assessment at 24 months were poorly
attended despite great efforts by the practice staff to
invite the patients. Such patients were more likely to be
younger males and have poorer oral health. Although
the reasons for non-attendance recorded by the dental
practices were incomplete, of those recorded, the most
frequently cited was no response to contact from the
dental practices. In the blended/incentive-driven prac-
tices, there was also a substantial number who failed to
attend prebooked appointments. Those lost to follow-up
had had multiple appointments and treatment including
ﬁllings, crowns and bridges (on average 6.46 appoint-
ments). One possible explanation for non-attendance at
recall may be that the problem for which they had ori-
ginally visited had been rectiﬁed, and in the absence
symptoms, they did not wish to visit the dentist for a
‘check-up’. This aligns with data that 27% English adults
only go to the dentist when they have a problem.2 The
proportion in this study is likely to be larger as they were
not already regular attenders. Previous studies have seen
much lower attrition rates,25 but such studies often
recruit regular attenders rather than those recruited in
this study who were new patients and who may have dif-
ferent drivers for attending the dentist. The low rate of
reattendance for regular dental care (thereby implying a
pattern of emergency care) provides support for the
care pathway approach recommended in the Steele
Report, which legitimises irregular dental attendance for
those who choose it.2 High proportions of patients
adopting this pattern will shape the practices in these
areas. Such practices will be characterised by the provi-
sion of more emergency care and more of the time-
Table 3 Mean per patient cost to dental providers
Blended contract practices Traditional contract practices
Resource Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Time of dental professionals £195.63 (102.92) £107.02 (55.55)
Materials and laboratory costs £54.88 (114.47) £58.34 (111.25)
Total £250.51 (186.85) £165.37 (146.28)
Payment to providers £459.77 (278.42) £281.57 (218.71)
Total mean healthcare costs £-209.26 (123.36) £-116.21 (99.16)
Table 4 Mean OHIP-14 and EQ-5D-3L scores by group
Blended contract practices (N=108) Traditional contract practices (N=102)
OHIP-14
Time point
Baseline Mean (SD) 8.99 (10.30) 9.12 (10.98)
Follow-up (24 months) Mean (SD) 5.60 (7.58) 7.38 (8.89)
Change Mean (p value) 3.39 (<0.001) 1.74 (0.051)
EQ-5D-3L
Time point
Baseline Mean (SD) 0.880 (0.250) 0.896 (0.232)
Follow-up (24 months) Mean (SD) 0.882 (0.207) 0.897 (0.257)
Change Mean (p value) −0.018 (0.235) 0.014 (0.552)
OHIP-14, Oral Health Impact Profile-14.
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consuming initial assessments. This burden needs to be
considered in the commissioning of services in these
areas.
The attendance rate for the study’s 24 month assess-
ment has confounded the conclusions that can be
drawn with respect to the relationship between the con-
tract types and clinical outcome. The primary clinical
outcome, BoP, favoured the blended/incentive-driven
model of service delivery, but the results should be
treated with caution given the high attrition and issues
of data quality. BoP was selected because it is responsive
to change and readily measured. It can be changed by
dental teams’ behaviours including preventive advice
and treatment but is also subject to other changes in
patients’ behaviours and measurement error. However, it
is likely that the inﬂuence of patient behaviours and
measurement error would be random and would attenu-
ate the apparent relationships between the contract
types and the patient outcome. The estimates of the
treatment effect may therefore be underestimated in
this study. It is possible that measurement bias may have
favoured one or other contract type, but this seems
unlikely. The utility of BoP as a surrogate for other oral
health outcomes warrants further investigation. It should
be noted that data quality for BoP and dental caries was
an issue with a substantial number of participants
excluded from the analysis following data cleaning.
These issues included problems with impossible transi-
tions between baseline and follow-up and missing data.
Further investigation is required to conﬁrm how to
improve the validity of clinical outcome measures in
primary dental care research. Dentition charting was
highlighted as a problem within the national Dental
Contract Pilots, where early ﬁndings revealed incom-
plete or absent charting for many patients.3 Perhaps
accurate charting could be used as a quality criterion in
the blended contracts.
The health economic analyses showed the blended/
incentive-driven contract was more costly for the com-
missioner. Overall oral health-related quality of life
(OHQoL), assessed using the OHIP-14, was higher for
participants in the blended/incentive-driven practices
than it was in practices under the traditional UDA-based
contract, but it did not represent a minimal important
clinical difference.26 The differences within and
between groups for the EQ-5D-3L were negligible. This
latter result was not entirely unexpected. While the
EQ-5D is the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE)23 recommended outcome of choice
for economic evaluation, its apparent insensitivity to oral
Table 5 Cost-effective results
Commissioner’s perspective Costs (£) OHIP (points)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Blended contract practices 459.77 (278.42) 7.110 (7.673)
Traditional contract practices 281.57 (218.71) 8.005 (8.699)
Incremental cost Incremental OHIP ICER (£/OHIP)
Blended contract vs Traditional practices 178.20 −0.895 199.22
Service providers perspective Costs (£) OHIP (points)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Blended contract practices −209.26 (123.36) 7.110 (7.673)
Traditional contract practices −116.21 (99.16) 8.005 (8.699)
Incremental cost Incremental OHIP ICER (£/OHIP)
Blended contract vs Traditional practices −93.05 −0.895 −104.03
BLENDED CONTRACT
DOMINATES
Commissioner’s perspective Costs (£) QALY
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Blended contract practices 459.77 (278.42) 1.659 (0.451)
Traditional contract practices 281.57 (218.71) 1.660 (0.342)
Incremental cost Incremental QALY ICER (£/QALY)
Blended contract vs Traditional practices 178.20 −0.0008 BLENDED CONTRACT
DOMINATED
Service providers’ perspective Costs (£) QALY
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Blended contract practices −209.26 (123.36) 1.659 (0.451)
Traditional contract practices −116.21 (99.16) 1.660 (0.342)
Incremental cost Incremental QALY ICER (£/QALY)
Blended contract vs Traditional practices −93.05 −0.0008 122,089.48
ICER, incremental cost-effective ratios; OHIP, Oral Health Impact Profile; QALY, quality-adjusted life years.
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health conditions led to the use of the OHIP-14.21 The
EQ-5D-3L has been reported to have adequate construct
and convergent validity, but appears to be less sensitive
than speciﬁc measures of OHQoL.27 28
The study design reported here enabled a direct com-
parison between practices offering incentive-driven pre-
ventative dentistry and those offering traditional solely
activity-driven contracts. These data enhance early ﬁnd-
ings from the national Dental Contract Pilots following
the Steele Report, which have focused on patient and
practitioners views of the new clinical pathway, reporting
them to be strongly supportive.3 Recent ﬁndings from
the national programme have focused on adaptation to
the new system and positive indications about clinical
beneﬁts in terms of a reduction of risk and health
improvement (measured through the RAG and a basic
periodontal examination). This study adds value to the
current evidence base of blended/incentive-driven con-
tracts, being the ﬁrst to systematically evaluate the
impact of a dental service provision on oral health out-
comes. It compares those operating under the existing
volume-based contract and those, driven in part by
incentives that have been developed in partnership with
the dental practices.
One of the challenges in undertaking the study was its
pragmatic study design. Neither the practices nor the
participants in the study were randomised. There will
inevitably be a degree of bias, given all the practices
were self-selected. The three blended contract practices
were newly established and had competitively tendered
to operate practices under the new contract, and as such
may be thought of as early adopters and may well be
atypical of dental practices in England. Similarly, while
the traditional contract practices were matched to the
blended/incentivised contract practices, they chose to
participate. One stumbling block for existing traditional
practices was that all the participants had to be new
patients. For some practices, this was not viable and such
those practices declined our invitation to participate.
The matched practices and high attrition also meant
that two of the three matched practices were unbalanced
in terms of participant numbers.15 This leads us to ques-
tion whether it is robust to pool the three pairings in
single analyses. Although there is some reassurance that
the effect size for the primary outcome (BoP, pooled
across practices) is similar to that included in the ori-
ginal power calculation (10.24% observed vs 10% in cal-
culation) and achieves statistical signiﬁcance (p<0.01),
this cannot guarantee the study achieved power of 80%
for the primary outcome as originally speciﬁed in the
study design.
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the evidence of the effectiveness of use of con-
tracting and incentives in health providers is still emer-
ging with further experimental research needed;
speciﬁcally, the impact on patient outcomes.10 This is
the ﬁrst UK study to assess the clinical and cost-
effectiveness of a blended contract in primary care den-
tistry providing an important perspective by which to
inform the dental contract reform. Although the ﬁnd-
ings overall with respect to the clinical effectiveness of
the blended/incentivised contracts are mixed, the
results of the primary outcome of gingivitis (BoP) favour
the blended/incentivised model, and there is some
reassurance that the effect size is similar to that included
in the original power calculation. The economic analysis
showed the blended/incentive-driven contracts arm of
the study to attract a higher cost for the dental
commissioner but to be ﬁnancially attractive for the
dental provider at the practice level. The results should
be treated with caution given the sample attrition.
Recommendations are to factor in higher attrition rates
into future primary care dental studies especially those
of high social deprivation where regular attendance is
not the usual pattern of service access.
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